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CHAPTER I

. INTRODUCTION

A central problem in the study of sentence memory is the common
observation that we are better able to remember the "gist" of sentential material than we are the exact verbal structure of that material
(e.g., Fillenbaum, 1966; Gomulicki, 1956; Jarvella, 1971; Sachs, 1967).
Interest in this issue has advanced through several areas of investigation: a) several theorists have suggested that the effect is due to the
interpretation of the deep structural relations of sentences; b) numerous other researchers have argued that sentence memory is constructive,
rather than interpretative, in nature; c) the role of one's present
cognitive knowledge in this process of sentence memory has been examined; and d) the importance of the availability of contextual information in the use of previously acquired knowledge has been discussed.
The present paper begins by sketching the development of sentence
memory through each of these areas of investigation.

The general ap-

proach to comprehension and memory deriving from this discussion is
then applied to the study of problem-solving processes.

In the exper-

.iments that are reported in the present study, subjects were given a
paragraph of English text to read.

Each subject was then presented a

problem concerning the material contained in the paragraph, and was
asked to solve the problem using supplementary information which was

1
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provided.

Data from these experiments were used to test several pre-

dictions concerning the effects of various context conditions upon the
comprehension and storage of sentences, and the subsequent use of this
information in the solution of an algebra word problem.
Sentence Memory
Interpretative Approach.

Several attempts to account for sentence

memory have relied heavily upon concepts developed within transformational linguistic theory (Chomsky, 1957, 1965, 1968).

Prominent among

these attempts has been the interpretative approach of Postal (Postal,
1964; Katz & Postal, 1964).

This approach is based upon the contention

that a sentence consists of both a surface structure and a deep structure.

The surface structure characterizes the phonological shape of the

sentence, while the interpretation of the deep structure comprises the
cognitive meaning of the sentence.

It is assumed that this semantic

interpretation of the deep structural relations of the sentence is necessary for comprehension, and that this interpretation completely characterizes the information that is stored.

There have been a large number

of studies which seem to support such an interpretative approach to
sentence retention (e.g., Bever, Lackner, & Kirk, 1969; Blumenthal,
_1967; Blumenthal & Boakes, 1967; Gough, 1965; Mehler, 1963; Miller,
1962; Perfetti, 1969; Savin & Perchonock, 1965).

However, several other

researchers (e.g., Barclay, 1973; Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972;
Bransford & Franks, 1971) have presented data and arguments in support
of a constructive approach to sentence memory.
Constructive Approach.

Proponents of a constructive view of sen-

tence memory contend that the semantic interpretation of the deep struc-

p
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ture of a sentence fails to provide a sufficient characterization of
what is stored.

They argue that while the interpretation of the deep

structure of a sentence is likely necessary for the comprehension of
that sentence to take place, the sentence's cognitive meaning is a
function of

complete semantic descriptions that are constructed,

t~e

and not the particular information specified by the linguistic inputs.
They view sentences as sources of information that can be used to
construct semantic descriptions of situations; descriptions which
frequently contain more information than is represented in the linguistic objects.

It is these semantic descriptions that are stored by

an individual in the process of sentence memory, not the deep structural information underlying the sentence.
Interpretative vs. Constructive.

A detailed consideration of the

study conducted by Bransford et al. (1972) may serve to clarify the
interpretative vs. constructive controversy in investigations of sentence memory.

In this study, stimulus materials similar to the follow-

ing two sentences were employed:
(1).

"Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam

beneath them."
(2).

"Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam

beneath them."
These two sentences, which differ only in the use of the word "beside"
or "on", describe situations which have vastly different semantic implications.

Whereas both sentence (1) and sentence (2) state that the fish

swam beneath the turtles, sentence (2) implies the additional information that the fish swam beneath the log.

This latter information is not

4
explicitly provided by the linguistic objects contained in sentence (2),
and is therefore not

acces~ible

simply through an interpretation of the

deep structural relations of that sentence.

This information is acces-

sible, however, if a person uses his general knowledge of the world,
and actively constructs a semantic description of the situation which
goes beyond the information represented by the linguistic objects in
sentence , (2).
Bransford et al. (1972) used sentences similar to sentence (1) and
sentence (2), presenting them to the subjects with the instructions
that questions about these sentences would be asked later.

Following

the presentation of these acquisition sentences, the subjects were
presented a second set of sentences, some of which they had heard previously in the acquisition list and some of which they had not, and
they were instructed to state which of these test sentences were
identical to those presented earlier.

It was found that when subjects

were presented a new test sentence in which only the final pronoun differentiated that sentence from, for example, acquisition sentence (1)
(e.g., "Three turtles rested beside a floating log and a fish swam
beneath it"), they had no difficulty recognizing that new sentence as
different from sentence (1).

However, when subjects were presented

the new test sentence, "Three turtles rested on a floating log and a
fish swam beneath it", they were unable to discriminate this new sentence from sentence (2).

In the former example, subjects were able to

recognize the new sentence as new since it described a situation different from that conveyed by sentence (1) (i.e., the fish swam beneath
the turtles vs. the fish swam beneath the log, respectively).

However,

p
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in the latter condition, the new test sentence and sentence (2) provided information that could be used to construct semantically similar
situations (e.g., the fish swam beneath the log), which resulted in
recognition errors.
These basic findings have been replicated and corroborated under
varied experimental conditions (Barclay, 1973; Barclay & Reid, 1974;
Bransford & Franks, 1971, 1972; Cofer, 1973; Flagg, Potts, & Reynolds,
1975; Franks & Bransford, 1971, 1972; Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon,
1973; Katz, 1973; Katz, Atkeson, & Lee, 1974; Potts, 1972; Singer, 1973;
Singer & Rosenberg, 1973).

In these studies it was consistently

demonstrated that subjects did not store representations of the deep
structural information of the

individ~al

acquisition sentences; rather,

they actively processed the sentential information, constructing
semantic representations which embodied inferred as well as explicitly
expressed information.

These results suggest that linguistic inputs

are not simply perceptual objects that may later be recalled or recognized; they are a source of information which a person interprets and
stores within the context of his present cognitive knowledge.

When an

individual hears a sentence (or a paragraph), he processes that information in view of what he knows about the world.

It is this synthesis of

previous knowledge and present input which determines the semantic
description of that information, and it is this description which
characterizes what is stored by the individual.

As Bransford, Barclay,

& Franks (1972) stated, words do not carry meaning; "people carry
meanings, and linguistic inputs merely act as cues which people can
use to recreate and modify their previous knowledge of the world"

6

(p. 207).

Present Cognitive Knowledge.

This contention that semantic repre-

sentations are the result of the constructive interplay of sentential
information and one's existing cognitive structures has been supported
by Kintsch and Monk (1972).

In this study, subjects were presented

one of two versions of a paragraph, either a simple version or a complex version.

In the simple version of the paragraph, very basic

syntax was used to generate several simple sentences which clearly and
logically expressed the underlying propositions of the paragraph.

In

the complex version, on the other hand, while the underlying propositions of the simple paragraph remained intact, they were in this condition expressed in one, long, complex sentence which was generated
through the use of several grammatical and syntactic transformations.
The following paragraphs illustrate examples of a simple and a complex
version of the same paragraph.
Simple:

"The council of elders in the land of Syndra meets whenever
a stranger arrives.

If the council meets and if the strang-

er presents the proper gifts to the council, he is not
molested by the natives.

The explorer Portmanteau came

to Syndra without any valuable gifts."
Complex: "The arrival of strangers in the land of Syndra, like the
explorer Portmanteau, who did not bring valuable gifts,
always resulted in the meeting of the council of elders,
which insured that the stranger was not molested by the
natives upon receipt of the proper gifts."
Half the subjects in each of the simple- and complex-paragraph condi-
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tions were allowed an indefinite amount of reading time, while the
remaining subjects were given only a limited amount of time in which
to read the paragraph.

Once a paragraph had been read by a subject,

he was asked to answer an inferential question concerning the information contained in that paragraph (e.g., "Was Portmanteau molested by
the natives?").
Kintsch and Monk found that if subjects were restricted in the
amount of reading time allowed, then those subjects in the simpleparagraph conditions were able to answer the inferential questions more
accurately than were those subjects in the complex-paragraph conditions.
If subjects were given an unlimited amount of reading time, however,
then the accuracy with which the questions were answered was found to
be unrelated to the original wording of the paragraph.

These and

similar results (see Greeno, 1974; King & Greeno, 1974) indicate that
grammatical and syntactic variables can affect the ease with which the
information contained in a paragraph may be assimilated by an individual.

However, as long as sufficient time to process and store the

information in a paragraph is allowed, then an individual is able to
construct a representation of that information which is independent of
these format variables (i.e., he is able to assimilate that information
into his present cognitive knowledge).

As a result, his ability to

answer inferential questions is unaffected by the grammatical and
syntactic complexity of the paragraph.

Thus, to the extent that an

individual is able to assimilate sentential information into his exist-

.

ing cognitive structures, he will be better able to use that information in subsequent tasks.

--8
Availability of Contextual Information.

The importance of context-

ual information in the assimilation of linguistic inputs into one's
previously acquired knowledge structures has been discussed by several
theorists and researchers (e.g., Blumenthal, 1970; Dooling, 1972;
Harris, 1974; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Norman, 1973; Olson, 1970).
Blumenthal, for example, has suggested that contextual information
acts as a prerequisite for the comprehension and retention of prose
materials; that is, an individual is capable of relating sentential
information to his existing cognitive knowledge only to the extent that
appropriate contextual information is available.

Regardless of how

well a sentence is organized and expressed, the information conveyed
by that sentence will not be comprehended and remembered unless the
same contextual "field" is shared to some extent by both the speaker
and the listener.
There have been several studies in which the facilitating effects
of contextual information upon sentence memory have been demonstrated.
Doll and Lapinsky (1974) and Johnson, Doll, Bransford, and Lapinsky
(1974) found that when subjects were instructed to learn a series of
unrelated sentences, each of which was constructed such that its
.contextual referent was not clearly specified (e.g., "He kicked twice
but got no change."), those subjects who were provided appropriate
contexts (e.g., "vending machine") were better able to recall the list
of sentences than were those subjects who did not receive contextual
cues.

Similar results have been obtained in studies in which the

availability of contextual information has been manipulated through
the presentation of prose passages in their proper syntactic order vs.

p
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either a random word order (Lachman & Dooling, 1968; Philipchalk, 1972;
Pompi & Lachman, 1967; Yuille & Paivio, 1969) or a random sentence order
(Meyers & Boldrick, 1975).

It has been consistently demonstrated in

these studies that those subjects who received the intact presentation
of a prose passage, which served to maintain and to convey the context
of the passage, were subsequently more likely to recall or to recognize
theme-related words than were those subjects who were presented random
arrangements of the prose passage.
Dooling and Lachman (1971) have also investigated the effects of
contextual information upon memory for prose passages.

In this study,

short paragraphs based upon clear and coherent themes were constructed
such that each of these themes was difficult to grasp without some
thematic cue.

For example, Dooling and Lachman used the following

paragraph in their study:
"WITH HOCKED GEMS FINANCING HIM / OUR HERO BRAVELY DEFIED ALL
SCORNFUL LAUGHTER / THAT TRIED TO PREVENT HIS SCHEME / YOUR EYES
DECEIVE / HE HAD SAID / AN EGG / NOT A TABLE / CORRECTLY TYPIFIES
THIS UNEXPLORED PLANET / NOW THREE STURDY SISTERS SOUGHT PROOF /
FORGING ALONG SOMETIMES THROUGH CALM VASTNESS / YET MORE OFTEN

.

OVER TURBULENT PEAKS AND VALLEYS / DAYS BECAME WEEKS / AS MANY
DOUBTERS SPREAD FEARFUL RUMORS ABOUT THE EDGE / AT LAST / FROM
NOWHERE / WELCOME WINGED CREATURES APPEARED / SIGNIFYING MOMENTOUS
SUCCESS"
Half of the subjects who were presented this passage were also presented
the following thematic title: "Christopher Columbus Discovering America";
the remaining subjects were not given a title for the passage.

Despite

10
the fact that all the subjects were familiar with the lexical meanings
of the words and the syntactic structures used in the passage, it was
found that recall of the paragraph was much better for those subjects
who were given the appropriate context before reading a passage than it
was for those subjects who did not receive thematic titles.
While these results clearly indicate the facilitating effects of
contextual information upon the recall of prose passages, they fail to
specify the locus of this effect: did the thematic titles produce more
efficient storage of the materials at input? or, did they aid in the
reconstruction of the materials during recall?

In an effort to evalu-

ate the relative strengths of these alternatives, Bransford and Johnson
(1972, 1973) and Dooling and Mullet (1973) used prose passages similar
to those employed by Dooling and Lachman (1971), and they presented
subjects with an appropriate thematic title a) before a passage was
read, b) after a passage was read, or c) not at all.

It was found that

those subjects in the Topic Before condition scored much higher, both
in terms of comprehension and recall, than did those subjects in the
Topic After condition.

Furthermore, the Topic After subjects performed

little better than did the Control subjects who were never presented a
·thematic title.

Since the Topic Before subjects had the benefit of

the title both during storage and during recall, whereas the Topic After
subjects were only able to use this contextual cue during recall, these
results support the suggestion that the availability of the appropriate
context serves as an aid in the storage of stimulus materials.
An explanation of how this contextual facilitation during storage
is accomplished has been offered by Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973).

11

As we have seen, simply having relevant preexperimental knowledge does
not guarantee its usefulness for sentence comprehension and memory.
Potentially meaningful material may be rendered incomprehensible if the
appropriate prior knowledge of the situation is not activated by some
contextual cue while the materials are being processed.

Bransford and

Johnson therefore contend that contexts enable an individual to interpret and organize input materials in a manner which is consistent with
his prior knowledge of the world.

They suggest that the extent to which

a prose passage may be remembered is largely a function of how well an
individual is able to use his prior knowledge to interpret and store
the incoming information.

They have received support for this sug-

gestion from postexperimental interviews with those subjects in Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973) who were presented prose passages without
their accompanying thematic titles.

These subjects reported that if

sufficient cues as to a passage's semantic context were not available,
then they actively searched for some way to make sense of the passage;
in other words, they attempted to find or formulate a suitable organization of personal existing cognitive structures into which the incoming
information might be integrated.

While most of these subjects were able

.to "make sense of", and therefore to remember, some portion of each
passage, rarely did an individual manage to locate a context which
enabled him to remember an entire passage.
Context can thus be seen to play an important role in the processing of information, such that the accuracy with which linguistic
inputs are comprehended and remembered is largely a function of the
extent to which they may be integrated into one's cognitive structure,

p
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which, in turn, is highly dependent upon the availability of appropriate contextual information.

So strong is this influence of context, in

fact, that Huttenlocher and Weiner (1971) and Trabasso (1973) have
stated that data from experiments in which contextual factors are
ignored have, at best, limited applicability.
Problem Solving
Memory in Problem Solving.

The methodological and theoretical

perspective provided by the research discussed thusfar offers a framework within which the investigation of problem-solving processes may
be interpreted.

In their discussions of problem-solving behavior,

numerous researchers and theorists (e.g., Duncan, 1959; Gagne, 1964;
Greeno, 1973; Hayes, 1965; Neisser, 1967; Posner, 1973) have emphasized
the importance of memory in problem solving.

When an individual comes

to the problem situation, he brings with him information, capabilities,
and strategies which he has learned and remembers from previous experience and training.

In the process of solving the problem, the individ-

ual must use those learned conceptions, selectively retrieving from
his memory those ideas and methods which are relevant to the problem.
Gagne (1964) has suggested that the mere presence of this relevant
.information in memory is sufficient for problem solution.

It has been

frequently noted (e.g., Bourne, Ekstrand, & Dominowski, 1971; Cofer,
1957; Maier, 1970; Maltzman, 1955; Simon & Lea, 1974), however, that
despite the fact that most problems consist of situations in which the
essential information and mental capacity necessary for problem solution
are readily available to the individual, many

prob~ems

for extended (and often indefinite) periods of time.

remain unsolved
In Duncker's (1945)

jiP
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candle problem, for example, the subjects are required to attach a
candle to the wall in such a way that it will burn without dripping
wax on the floor.

In spite of the fact that the subjects are provided

with the necessary materials (i.e., a candle, a small box, some tacks,
and some matches) and have the necessary knowledge to obtain the solution (which consists of attaching the box to the wall with the tacks
and then placing the lighted candle on the box), the problem is frequently solved only after a hint as to its solution has been given.
While several researchers (e.g., Bartlett, 1958; Bruner, 1957; Koffka,
1957; Raaheim, 1971) have suggested that the realization of such problem
solutions is retarded by the existence of a situational "gap" which
prevents the transformation of the problem state into the desired goal
state, explanations of this "gap" have generally been as vague and
elusive as the term itself (see Berlyne, 1965; Davis, 1966; Neimark &
Santa, 1975).
Context and Knowledge Orgainzation in Problem Solving.

It is this

author's contention that the presence of this "gap" in the problem
situation derives from the learned information brought to the problem
by the individual.

Utilization of such information is dependent not

.only upon its existence in memory, but also upon its relation to the
circumstances and conditions of the situation at hand.

If the presenta-

tion of a problem situation fails to activate relevant existing cognitive structures within an individual, then the information contained in
those structures will be unavailable for use in obtaining the solution
to the problem.

To the extent that an individual is provided contexts

that will enable him to interpret and organize problem materials in a

F'
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manner which is consistent with his prior knowledge of the world, he
will exhibit successful problem-solving behavior.
Support for this contention has been obtained by Katona (1940).
In his investigations of learning and problem solving, Katona found
that learning through understanding aided subsequent problem-solving
performance much more than did either learning by rule or learning by
rote.

It was suggested that these basic findings, which have been

corroborated by several researchers (e.g., Forgus & Schwartz, 1957;
Gagne & Brown, 1961; Haslerud & Meyers, 1958; Hilgard, Edgren, &
Irvine, 1954; Hilgard, Irvine, & Whipple, 1953), resulted from the
development of differential information structures by the subjects
within the different learning conditions.

While the understanding

condition resulted in the learning of "meaningful organization", the
principle-learning and memorization conditions produced learning of
"senseless connections".

In an attempt to account for this learning

of "meaningful organization" through understanding, Gagne and Brown
(1961) suggested that learning with understanding requires an individual to "reinstate", or actively produce, concepts which can later be
used to solve new problems.

This reinstatement of concepts, which

.Gagne and Brown pointed out may arouse previously acquired cognitive
organizations within the individual [for further support of this
•
suggestion, see Ausubel (1968) and Piaget (1970)], better enables the

use of acquired knowledge in novel situations than does rote learning.
Consistent with this position, Greeno (1972) and his associates
(Egan & Greeno, 1973; Mayer & Greeno, 1972) found that when subjects
were taught to use the binomial distribution through the use of a

,.
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formula (i.e., rule learning), performance was better on subsequent
test problems which could be solved by a straightforward use of the
formula than it was on problems that required an interpretation of the
formula.

Those subjects, however, who were taught to use the binomial

distribution through instructions which explained the variables in the
formula in terms of concepts which were part of the subject's general
understanding of random events (i.e., learning by understanding),
excelled both on those test problems which required a straightforward
use of the formula and on those problems requiring an interpretational
use of the formula.

These findings indicate, as was suggested by

Katona (1940), that learning by understanding and learning by rule
produce differences not only in the quantity of learning, but also in
the quality of that learning.

As Greeno and his co-workers pointed out,

learning to use the. binomial distribution through an "understanding"
of its relevant variables enabled subjects to realize relationships
between the new material and their present knowledge.

This realization

led to the establishment of new links among existing knowledge structures and made possible the integration of the new information into
these cognitive organizations.

Learning by rule, however, deemphasized

. the connections between the new material and the subjects' previous
knowledge of the world, and prompted subjects to add new components to
their existing cognitive structures.

These new components may have

been well organized among themselves (a situation which Mayer and Greeno
termed "internal connectedness"), but such an organization was useful
only in the solution of problems which required a simple computational
use of these components.

It was only when the new information was

,
16

connected to other elements in an individual's general cognitive
organization (i.e., "external connectedness") that the person performed well both on those problems requiring a direct application and
on those requiring an interpretation of the new information.
Greeno (1973) has similarly suggested that there are two ways in
which an individual's knowledge might be organized.

The first of

these, which is comparable to the "internal connectedness" discussed
above, has been labeled "algorithmic knowledge" by Greeno.

This type

of knowledge organization, which simply consists of an ability to use ·
a relevant set of rules, does not involve an understanding of the
operation of those rules.

The second type of knowledge organization,

which has been termed "propositional knowledge" {see Kintsch, 1972),
corresponds to the "external connectedness" discussed by Mayer and
Greeno.

In Propositional knowledge, the information presented is

contextually linked to the general ideas already in the subject's
semantic memory; that is, the new information is "embedded" in the
person's general knowledge of the world.
In an effort to manipulate the development of these two types of
knowledge organization within subjects, Greeno (1973), Kieras and
.Greeno (1975), and Mayer and Greeno (1975) conducted experiments in
which subjects were required to memorize either a set of conceptually
meaningful formulas or a set of equivalent formulas which were stated
in terms of semantically nonmeaningful letters.

For example, the

following equations were used to describe an hypothetical automobile
trip:
Driving time = arrival time - leaving time

,
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Distance

= driving

time x average speed

Gas mileage = distance / gas used
Total time

= driving

time + preparation time.

The following equivalent equations using nonmeaningful letters were
alternatively employed:
V

=F

L

D=VxA

M= D I G
T = V

+

P.

In the case of the former equations, the information presented has
cognitive meaning for the subject; that is, it can be understood in
relation to the subject's knowledge of traveling time, speed, distance,
gas consumption, etc.

In the case of the nonmeaningful equations,

however, while strong rigid connections among the variables in the
formulas are fostered, there are no contextual cues which might enable
an individual to relate the information provided to his existing
cognitive knowledge.

As a result, one might expect subjects to better

comprehend and remember the information provided when the meaningful
equations are presented than when the nonmeaningful formulas are used,
.which should result in superior problem-solving performance in the
former situation.

Consistent with this expectation, Mayer and Greeno

(1975) found that subjects who received the meaningful equations performed much better on subsequent problem-solving tasks than did those
subjects who were presented the nonmeaningful equations.
Incomplete Information in Problem Solving.

Duncker (1945) has

pointed out that in solving a problem, an individual must consider the
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behavioral constraints that are imposed upon the problem solution by
the restricting requirements surrounding the problem situation.

As

this statement suggests, an important element in efficient problemsolving behavior is the ability to recognize conditions which fail to
satisfy the restrictions which encompass the problem situation (Mayer

& Greeno, 1972).

Support for this contention has been obtained by

Paige and Simon (1966).

These researchers found that when subjects

were required to solve an algebra word problem, those subjects who
reported having constructed a conceptual image of the problem elements,
thus relating these elements to their knowledge of the world, were
better able to detect inconsistencies in the task requirements than
were those subjects who reported that they had attempted to solve the
problem by means of more mechanical, or algorithmic, manipulations of
the problem elements.

Greeno (1973) similarly reported that those

subjects who were presented a problem situation which consisted of
semantically meaningful equations, which resulted in a propositional
knowledge of the problem elements, were able to detect incomplete and
inconsistent information in the structure of the problem more easily
than were those subjects who were presented equivalent nonmeaningful
.equations describing the problem situation.

These results indicate

that to the extent that an individual is able to restructure and integrate the elements of a problem situation into his existing cognitive
structure, the better will he be able to detect inconsistencies and
incomplete information in that problem situation.
Transformational Use of Information in Problem Solving.

Egan and

Greeno (1973) and Mayer and Greeno (1975) have similarly suggested that
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whether or not an individual is able to relate the elements of the
problem situation to his knowledge of the world has a strong effect
upon his ability to handle modifications of the presentation format
of those elements.

As Mayer and Greeno observed, those subjects who

were presented a problem situation consisting of nonmeaningful equations retained the presentation ·organization of the problem elements
much more rigidly than did those subjects who received the meaningful
equations.

These findings indicate that the more an individual is

able to organize and integrate the elements of a problem situation into
his existing knowledge structure, the more flexible will be his use of
those elements; that is, the better will he be able to transform, or
reinterpret, those elements.
The Present Study
Two experiments were conducted in the present study.

In each

of these experiments subjects were presented a problem situation, a
statement of the problem to be solved, and a set of items of information which were to be used in the solution of that problem.

The

problem used was logically structured, and the information provided
enabled a solution to be obtained in a logical and straightforward
.manner; that is, the solution could be obtained through the selection
of a specific sequence of the informational items.

Such an organ-

ized sequence of responses made in an effort to achieve the solution
to a problem has been termed a "strategy" (Bourne et al. , 1971).
To the extent that a subject's strategy approximates the logical
structure of the problem, his strategy may be said to be efficient.
In the present study, a measure of problem-solving efficiency was
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obtained through an analysis of the number of items of information
required by each subject to solve the problem.

In addition to this

Efficiency Score, measures were also taken on the total time to
solution, the time required for the preparation of a solution strategy,
the inter-item latencies, and the accuracy of the problem solution
given by the subject.
Experiment I.

The first experiment conformed to a factorial

crossing of three treatment variables, with two levels per variable.
Half the subjects in this experiment recieved a statement of the
problem situation in which a thematic cue was presented which
provided an appropriate context for the problem.

The remaining

subjects were presented the same statement of the problem situation,
except that no contextual information was provided.

Each subject

was then presented a set of items of information which was to be used
in the solution of the problem.

This set of items of information

was structured in such a way that half the subjects in each of the
context and no-context conditions was permitted to select either of
two possible solution strategies in order to solve the problem.
The specific strategy used by an individual was indicated by the
· informational items which he selected in the process of solving the
problem.

The remaining subjects in each of the context and

no-context conditions were presented a restricted set of inf ormational items.

This set of items of information was structured

such that these latter subjects were restricted to the use of only
one of the two solution strategies.

Each of these latter subjects

was presented additional items of information which provided some
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of the information required for the use ·of the solution strategy
which was not permitted; however, these additional items failed to
provide all of the information necessary for the use of this alternate strategy.

Thus these latter subjects in Experiment I were

provided "incomplete" information.
The wording

of the items of information presented to the subjects

was also manipulated in Experiment I.

For half the subjects in each

of the four categories generated by the factorial crossing of the
availability of a contextual cue and the number of allowed solution
strategies, the items of information provided were stated in terms
of positive sentences; the remainder of the subjects received
equivalent negative statements.

It has been consistently demonstrated

(e.g., Clark & Chase, 1972; Slobin, 1966; Trabasso, Rollins,

& Shaughnessy, 1971; Wason, 1961) that due to the transformations,
or reinterpretations, necessary for the comprehension of negative
sentences, positive statements require less time for comprehension
than do equivalent negative sentences.
Experiment II.

The second experiment consisted of a 2 x 3 x 2

factorial design in which the three treatment variables were completely
.crossed.

Two versions of the statement of the problem situation were

employed in this experiment.

Half of the subjects were presented a

simple version of the problem situation in which several simple
sentences were used which clearly explained the problem situation.
The remaining subjects were presented a complex version of the
problem situation in which one long, complex sentence was used to
explain the problem situation.
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The availability of a thematic cue was manipulated in Experiment II such that an equal number of subjects in each of the simpleand complex-paragraph conditions was provided an appropriate context
a) before reading the statement of the situation, b) after reading
the statement of the problem situation, but before attempting to
solve the problem, or c) not at all.
The amount of reading time allowed each subject was also manipulated in Experiment II.

For half the subjects in each of the six

conditions resulting from the factorial crossing of paragraph
complexity and availability of the contextual cue, a single reading
of the statement of the problem situation was allowed; the remaining
subjects in each condition were instructed to read the statement of
the problem situation three times.
Following the presentation of the statement of the problem
situation, each subject was provided a set of items of information
which was to be used in the solution of the problem.

The set of

informational items employed in Experiment II was structured in such
a way that each subject was allowed to use either of two possible
solution strategies.
Hypotheses.

These manipulations of the problem materials were

brought about to test several hypotheses concerning the use of acquired
information in the process of solving a problem.
The findings of Dooling and his associates (Dooling & Lachman,
1971; Dooling & Mullet, 1973) and Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973)
have indicated that when a subject is provided an appropriate thematic
cue for a prose passage, he is better able to comprehend and remember
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that passage than when no contextuai cue is provided.

Greeno (1973)

and his co-workers (Kieras & Greeno, 1975; Mayer & Greeno, 1975) have
similarly manipulated the availability of contextual information in a
problem-solving paradigm.

These researchers have required subjects

to memorize either a set of meaningful or a set of nonmeaningful
equations, and to solve a problem using the information contained in
those equations.

Consistent with the expectation that meaningful

equations result in superior comprehension and storage of information,
Mayer and Greeno found that those subjects who received the meaningful
equations were able to use the information contained in the equations
more efficiently than were those subjects who were presented the
nonmeaningful equations.

As a result, the former subjects exhibited

superior problem-solving performance.
It has been similarly suggested by Bransford and Johnson (1972,
1973) and by Greeno (1973) that these findings are related to the
availability of previously acquired cognitive knowledge in the interpretation and storage of the incoming information.

If the incoming

material is semantically meaningful (e.g., appropriate contexts or
meaningful equations have been provided), then subjects are able to
·relate this material to their existing knowledge of the world. As a
result, they will be better able to detect incomplete information
(Greeno, 1973; Paige & Simon, 1966) and to transform the presentation
format of the information (Mayer & Greeno, 1975) than will subjects
who are unable to relate the new information to their present
cognitive structures.
The following two hypotheses were therefore proposed:
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a)

When a contextual cue is not provided in the statement of the
problem situation, then those subjects who are provided complete
information (i.e., are allowed to use either of the two possible
solution strategies) exhibit better Efficiency Scores and less
total time to solution than do those subjects who are presented
incomplete information (i.e., are allowed to use only one of
the two solution strategies).

When a context is provided in

the statement of the problem situation, however, then there is
no difference in the Efficiency Scores and the total time to
solution of those subjects who are allowed to use either of
the solution strategies and those subjects who are allowed to
use only one of the strategies.
b)

When the items of information provided are expressed in terms
of negative statements, Efficiency Scores and total time to
solution are poorer than when the informational items are
expressed in terms of positive sentences.

The difference,

however, between the performance of those subjects who are
presented the negative statements and those who receive the
positive sentences is less when a contextual cue is provided in
the statement of the problem situation than when it is not.
Kintsch and Monk (1972) obtained data which indicate that if an
individual is given sufficient time to process the information in a
prose passage, then the representation of that information in memory
is independent of the complexity of the original passage.

The fol-

lowing hypothesis was therefore proposed:
c)

When subjects are allowed to read the statement of the
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problem situation only once, then those subjects who are
presented the complex statement of the problem situation
exhibit poorer Efficiency Scores and longer total time to
solution than do those subjects who are given the simple
version of the problem situation.

When subjects are allowed

to read the statement of the problem situation three times,
however, there is no difference in the Efficiency Scores and
the total time to solution for those subjects given the complex
version of the problem situation and those given the simple
statement of the problem situation.
The availability of contextual information has been shown to be an
important variable in the comprehension and retention of prose materials.
Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973) and Dooling and Mullet (1973) have
obtained data which indicate that contextual information aids recall
more if it is available at the time of input than if it is provided at
the time of recall.

In fact, subjects who were given the context at

the time of recall performed little better than did those subjects
who did not receive any contextual information.

The following hypo-

thesis derives from these findings:
d)

Those subjects who are provided the contextual cue before
reading the statement of the problem situation display better
Efficiency Scores and less total time to solution than do
either those subjects who are given the contextual cue after
reading the statement of the problem situation or those
subjects who are never provided the appropriate context for
the problem.

,
CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects
The subjects were 161 Loyola University students who ranged in age
from 18 to 30.

Of these subjects, 13 were not able to solve at least

one of the two practice problems and were therefore excluded from the
analyses.

Four of the remaining subjects successfully solved each of

the practice problems, but were rejected when they responded on the
experimental problem by first selecting all of the relevant items of
information and then deciding which of those informational items were
needed in order to solve the problem, thus distorting their Efficiency
Scores as a measure of their problem solving efficiency.

Forty-eight

subjects participated in Experiment I and 96 subjects participated in
Experiment II.

Each subject was tested individually in a session which

lasted approximately 20 min ••
Materials
A deck of 3" X 5" index cards was used to present each problem
situation.

At the top of an accompanying 9" X 11" display board

· 1) was the statement of the problem that was to be solved.

(Figure

Beneath the

problem statement, a set of interrogative probes pertaining to the
problem situation were displayed.

These interrogative probes were

questions, the answers to which could be used to solve the problem.
The probes were presented on long narrow inserts which were placed in
slots in the display board in such a way that the questions were
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PROBLEM STATEMENT

QUESTIONS

ANSWERS

D
D
D
I

D
D

D
D

Figure 1.

Diagram of the display board.

I

p
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visible through narrow rectangular windows.

To the right of each inter-

rogative probe was located its appropriate answer.

Each answer was

placed in such a manner that it was not visible until the insert on
which its corresponding interrogative probe was presented was pulled
approximately

~

in. to the right, at which time the answer appeared in

a small square window in the display board.
Score sheets were used which allowed the experimenter to record for
each subject the number of interrogative probes selected, the total time
needed to obtain the solution to the problem, the time required for the
formulation of the solution strategy, the inter-probe latencies, and the
final problem solution that was given.
The timing device used was a Sodeco impulse counter which registered 10 impulses per sec. from an impulse generator.

The desired time

intervals were printed out by the counter onto a tape.

The experimenter

was able to regulate the counter print-out with a control box interfaced
with the timing device.
Procedure
General.

In Experiment I and Experiment II each subject was re-

quired to attempt the solution of three problems.

For each of these

.problems, the problem situation was presented on a series of index cards.
One sentence (or one phrase) was typed on each card, and subjects were
paced through the deck at a rate of seven sec. per card.

The statement

of each problem and the interrogative probes pertaining to the problem
were presented on separate display boards.
The first two problems presented to each subject were practice
problems.

The first of these (Table 1) was based upon a situation in
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TABLE 1
PRACTICE PROBLEM I

Problem Situation
Card 1: Several students were enrolled in an introductory
fine arts course at Loyola last semester.
Card 2: Some of these students were males and some were
females.
Card 3: Only two grades were given in the course, either
pass or fail.
Problem Statement
How many males passed the course?
Interrogative Probes
How many students were enrolled in the course?
How many tests were given in the course?

Answers
63
3

How many students passed the course?

49

How many students failed the course?

14

How many males were enrolled in the course?

40

How many times a week did the class meet?
How many females were enrolled in the course?
How many females failed the course?

3
23

4
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which there are two attributes (i.e., sex and achievement of students)
with two values per attribute (i.e., male-female; pass-fail).

The

second practice problem (Table 2) was similarly constructed from a
situation consisting of two attributes (i.e., color and objective of
airplanes) with two values per attribute (i.e., silver or white planes;
awaiting either take-off or landing instructions).
If a subject successfully solved each of these initial problems,
he was asked to solve a third problem which was based upon a situation
in which there are two attributes (i.e., print and consistency of
objects) with three and two values per attribute, respectively (i.e.,
solids, patterns, and whites; delicates and durables).

The phrasing

of this problem situation, the number of times that it was presented,
and the wording and function of the interrogative probes accompanying
it were manipulated in order to construct the experimental treatment
conditions in Experiment I and Experiment II.
Experiment I.

Subjects were shown one of two presentations of the

experimental problem situation.

Half of the subjects received a version

of the problem situation in which thematic information about the problem
was omitted (Table 3).

The remaining subjects were provided the appro-

priate context for the problem.

These latter subjects received the

same problem situation as is presented in Table 3, except that the first
card was changed to read, "Washing clothes is actually quite simple."
The statements describing the problem situation were typed individually
on index cards, and each subject in the context and no-context conditions was presented the appropriate deck of cards three times at a rate
of seven sec. per card.

TABLE 2
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PRACTICE PROBLEM II

Problem Situation
Card 1: There were several planes awaiting instructions at
Midway Airport last Monday.
Card 2: Some of these planes were silver and some were white.
Card 3: Some of the silver planes were on the ground awaiting
take-off instructions and some were in the air
awaiting landing instructions.
Card 4: Some of the white planes were on the ground awaiting
take-off instructions and some were in the air
awaiting landing instructions.
Problem Statement
How many white planes were on the ground awaiting take-off
instructions?
Interrogative Probes
How many planes were there altogether awaiting
instructions?
How many non-silver planes were not on the ground
awaiting take-off instructions?

Answers

25
5

How many silver planes were on the ground awaiting
take-off instructions?

10

How many non-white planes were awaiting instructions?

14

How many people were waiting to board a plane at the
airport?

987

How many silver planes were in the air awaiting
landing instructions?
Were weather conditions poor that day?
How many planes awaiting instructions were not on the
ground awaiting take-off instructions?

4
Yes

9

F
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TABLE 3
EXPERIMENTAL PROBLEM SITUATION
WITHOUT THE CONTEXTUAL CUE

Card 1:

The procedure is actually quite simple.

Card 2:

You may have to go somewhere else if the proper
facilities are not available.

Card 3:

Otherwise, you are ready to begin.

Card 4:

Once the facilities are available, you arrange objects
into different groups depending upon their
makeup.

Card 5:

You could arrange them into solids, patterns, and whites.

Card 6:

One grouping might be sufficient, though, depending
on how much must be done.

Card 7:

But it is important not to overdo things.

Card 8:

That is, it is better to try too few objects at
once than too many.

Card 9:

Therefore you might want to further divide the objects
into delicate and durable groupings.

Card 10: At first the whole procedure will seem complicated.
Card 11: But soon it will become just another fact of life.
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After reading the description of the problem situation three times,
the deck of index cards was taken from the subject and he was given the
problem display board.

At the top of this display board was presented

the following instructions:
were just described.

"The

objects~

placed in the groups that

Using the information below, determine:

objects were there altogether?"

How many

Below these instructions on the display

board were presented interrogative probes which could be used to solve
the problem.

The wording of these interrogative probes was manipulated

such that half the subjects in each of the context and the no-context
conditions were presented interrogative probes which were stated in
terms of positive sentences.

The positively-worded interrogative probes

which were used are listed in Table 4.

The remaining subjects received

interrogative probes of equivalent meaning, but these probes were presented in terms of negative sentences (Table 5).
Eight interrogative probes were presented to each subject.
distinct sets of eight interrogative probes were used.

Three

The collective

properties of the interrogative probes in each of these three sets
constituted the functional manipulation of the solution availability.
The uniqueness of these sets evolved from the fact that different types
· of strategies and numbers of solutions were allowed by the interrogative
probes in each set.

One of the sets allowed the use of either of two

solution strategies (i.e., "complete" information was provided), while
each of the remaining two sets allowed the use of only one of the two
strategies (i.e., "incomplete" information was
there are two possible solution strategies
"A" through "G" from Table 4 or Table 5 accompany tll
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TABLE 4
LIST OF POSSIBLE INTERROGATIVE
PROBES: POSITIVE WORDING

Interrogative Probes

Answers

A How many delicate objects were placed in the
solid group?

13

B

How many delicate objects were placed in the
white group?

9

c

How many durable objects were there?

50

D

How many delicate objects were placed in the
patterned group?

17

E

How many durable objects were placed in the
patterned group?

15

F

How many objects were placed in the solid
groups?

36

G

How many objects were placed in the white
groups?

21

H How many groups of objects were there?
I

How long did it take to place the objects
into the groups?

6

15 min.
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TABLE 5
LIST OF POSSIBLE INTERROGATIVE
PROBES: NEGATIVE WORDING

Interrogative Probes

Answers

A How many non-durable objects were not placed
in the patterned group not the
white group?

13

How many non-durable objects were not placed
in the solid group nor the
patterned group?

9

B

c

How many non-delicate objects were there?

50

D

How many non-durable objects were not placed
in the solid group nor the white
group?

17

How many non-delicate objects were not placed
in the solid group nor the white
group?

15

F

How many objects were not placed in the patterned group nor the white group?

36

G

How many objects were not placed in the solid
group nor the patterned group?

21

E

H How many groups of objects were there?
I

How long did it take to place the objects
into the groups?

6

15 min.

36
on the display board:
a)

The subject may first find out how many durable objects there
were ("C").

Once this information has been obtained, the subject

only has to find out how many delicate objects there were in
order to solve the problem.

This value may be determined by

adding together the number of delicate objects in the solid
group ("A"), delicate objects in the white group ("B"), and
delicate objects in the patterned group ("D").

By then adding

the number of durable objects and the number of delicate objects
the subject may determine the total number of objects.
b)

By adding the number of delicate objects in the patterned group
("D") and the number of durable objects in the patterned group
("E"), the subject may determine the number of objects in the
patterned groups.

This value may then be added to the number of

objects in the solid groups ("F") and the number of objects in
the white groups ("G") in order to determine the total number
of objects.
However, if the probe "A" in the present illustration is replaced by
probe "H", it is no longer possible to determine the number of delicate
objects in the solid group.

As a result, the use of the first of the two

solution strategies listed above is nullified.

Similarly, if probe "H"

replaces probe "E", the use of the second solution strategy is prohibited, since the number of durable objects in the patterned group is no
longer attainable.

(Probe "I" is a filler probe which is not relevant

to the solution of the problem.

It was randomly presented with the

other interrogative probes, thus filling out each set so that eight
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probes were presented to each subject.)
Half the subjects in each of the context-positive wording, contextnegative wording, no-context-positive wording, and no-context-negative
wording conditions discussed above were provided interrogative probes
which were complete (i.e., they were presented probes "A" through "G",
which allowed the use of either of the two solution strategies).

The

remaining subjects in each condition were presented interrogative
probes which were incomplete (i.e., they allowed the use of only one of
the two solution strategies.

Half of these latter subjects received

probes "B" through "H", while the remaining subjects received probes
"A" through "D" and "F" through "H".
Six randomly assigned subjects participated in each of the eight
treatment conditions which resulted from the manipulation of the independent variables.

These variables, along with the resultant eight

treatment conditions, are presented in Table 6.
Experiment II.

One of two versions of the experimental problem

situation was presented to each subject.
a simple version of the problem situation.

Half of the subjects received
This simple version was the

same as that seen by the subjects in Experiment I (Table 3).

The re-

maining subjects were presented a complex version (Table 7), which was
constructed through the use of numerous grammatical and syntactic transformations of the simple version, and it described the problem situation
in one long sentence.

Care was taken to use semantically equivalent

expressions in the two versions of the problem situation whenever
possible, and the two versions were equated for number of words used.
One third of the subjects in each of the simple and complex

TABLE 6
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND RESULTANT
EIGHT TREATMENT CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT I .

Availability of
the Context

~

Wording of the
Interrogative Probes

Positive (P)

Completeness of the
Interrogative Probes

Condition

Complete (T)

CP T

Incomplete (I)

CP I

Complete (T)

CNT

Incomplete (I)

CNI

Complete (I)

XP T

Incomplete (I)

XP I

Complete (T)

X NT

Incomplete (I)

XNI

Context (C)
Negative (N)

.

Positive (P)
No Context (X)
Negative (N)
VJ

00
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TABLE 7
COMPLEX VERSION OF EXPERIMENTAL
PROBLEM SITUATION

Card 1:

The procedure is actually quite simple

Card 2:

once the proper facilities are available,

Card 3:

although you may have to go somewhere else if the
necessary facilities are not available,

Card 4:

when you begin by arranging objects into different
groups depending upon their makeup,

Card 5:

possibly arranging them into solids, patterns, and
whites;

Card 6:

but since it is important not to overdo things,

Card 7:

while one grouping might be sufficient depending
on how much must be done,

Card 8:

it is better to try too few objects at once than
too many,

Card 9:

which may mean that you will want to further divide
the objects into delicate and durable
groupings,

Card 10: which may make the whole procedure seem complicated,
Card 11: but soon it will become just another fact of life.
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conditions was verbally provided the appropriate context by the experimenter before reading the statement of the problem situation.

Another

third of the subjects in each of the simple and complex conditions was
presented the contextual cue by the experimenter after the statement of
the problem situation had been read, but before the problem to be solved
was received.

For the remainder of the subjects, no contextual infor-

mation was provided.
Each statement in the simple and complex versions of the problem
situation was typed on a separate index card, and each card was presented for seven sec.

For half the subjects in each of the six categories

generated by the factorial crossing of paragraph complexity and availability or contextual cue, the deck of cards describing the experimental
problem situation was presented only once.

The remaining subjects were

paced through the deck of cards three times.
After the subject was allowed either one or three readings of the
experimental problem situation, the deck of index cards was collected by
the experimenter, and the subject was given the problem display board.
The instructions at the top of this display board were the same as
those employed in Experiment I.

Below these instructions on the display

board were presented interrogative probes that were to be used in the
solution of the problem.

The collective properties of the interrogative

probes employed in Experiment II were such that each subject was
allowed the use of either of the two possible solution strategies.
Eight randomly assigned subjects participated in each of the
resultant 12 treatment conditions.

The interrelationships of the

independent variables and the 12 treatment conditions are presented
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in Table 8.
Scoring
Each subject was free to choose the number and the order of the
interrogative probes he wished to have answered in solving the problem,
but he was cautioned in the instructions to make his probe selections
carefully.

(The instructions, as they were tape recorded and played

for each subject are presented in Appendix I.)

Thus the experimenter

was able to observe directly the strategy employed by each subject as
it was demonstrated by the sequence of interrogative probes chosen to
be answered.

(It is, of course, a necessary assumption here that the

strategy displayed by a subject on any given problem does indeed reflect
his implicit search, evaluation, and subsequent utilization of the
available information.)

It has been assumed that an ideal strategy for

the solution of the problem does exist, and that this ideal strategy is
that selection of probes which accumulates the information needed to
solve the problem in the most parsimonious manner, i.e., without the
selection of interrogative probes which provide irrelevant, redundant,
or otherwi.se unusable information.

To the extent that a subject's

solution strategy approaches this ideal strategy, the number of probes
selected will decrease, with a minimum of four interrogative probes for
problem solution.

The number of interrogative probes selected by each

subject was interpreted as his Efficiency Score.
In addition to this Efficiency Score, measures of problem-solving
performance were obtained by observing for each subject the total time
needed to obtain the solution to the problem, the time required for the
preparation of the solution strategy (i.e., the time which elapsed

TABLE 8
INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND RESULTANT 12 TREATMENT CONDITIONS

Complexity of the
Problem Situation

Presentation of the
Context in the
Problem Situation

Number of Readings
of the Problem Situation

Condition

One (0)

S B0

Three (T)

S BT

One (0)

SA 0

Three (T)

S AT

One (0)

S N0

Three (T)

S NT

One (0)

CB0

Three (T)

CBT

One (0)

CA0

Three (T)

CAT

One (0)

CN0

Three (T)

r.

Before (B)

Simple (S)

After (A)

Not At All (N)

Before (B)

Complex (C)

After (A)

Not At All (N)

N 'T'

.;:..
N
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between the presentation of the display board and the first probe
selection), the inter-probe latencies (i.e., the time which elapsed
between probe selections), and the accuracy of the problem solution
that was offered.
timed.

lhe subjects were not told that they were being

CHAPTER III
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experiment I
A 2 3 ANOVA was computed on the total time data.
this analysis are summarized in Table 9.

The results of

The F-ratios for the context

by wording and context by completeness interactions are less than unity,
thus not supporting the first two hypotheses stated above.

Significance

was obtained for the main effects of context, wording, and completeness.
The mean and median total times to solution for each group involved in
these main effects are presented in Table 10.

Those subjects who were

given a context in the statement of the problem situation required less
time to solve the problem than did those subjects who were not presented
a context.

The positive wording of the interrogative probes resulted in

less total time to solution than did the negative wording of the probes.
Those subjects who received interrogative probes which provided incomplete information (i.e., allowed the use of only one of the two possible solution strategies) required more time to solve the problem than
did those subjects who were provided complete information (i.e., allowed
the use of either of the two possible solution strategies).

These find-

ings are consistent with preexperimental expectations.
Summarized in Table 11 are the results of a 2 3 ANOVA computed on
the Efficiency Score data.

The main effects of context, wording, and

completeness, as well as the second order interaction of these three
variables, are significant.

The context by wording by completeness
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TABLE 9
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TOTAL

.

'

. TIME DATA: EXPERIMENT I

Source of.Variance

SS

df

MS

Context (X)

457078.8

1

457078.8

Wording (W)

1307852.0

1

1307852.0

467208.2

1

467208.2

7874.0

1

7874.0

164476.1

1

164476.1

5293.8

1

5293.8

98729. 9

1

98729. 9

2698715.0

40

67467.9

Completeness (C)
x by

w

x by c

w by

c

x by

w by

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001

c

F

6. 77 *
19.38 ****
6.92 *

2.44

1.46
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TABLE 10
MEAN AND MEDIAN TOTAL TIME TO
SOLUTION: EXPERIMENT I

Condition

Mean

Median

SD

Context

332.04

221.35

262.34

No Context

527.21

541.80

371. 09

Positive

264.56

195.15

203.59

Negative

594.69

619.35

357.89

Incomplete

528.29

502.20

360.10

Complete

330.97

217.90

276.43
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TABLE 11
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EFFICIENCY
SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT I

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

Context (X)

5.33

1

5.33

4.64 *

Wording (W)

5.33

1

5.33

4.64 *

27.00

1

27.00

x by w

0.33

1

0.33

x by c

0.33

1

0.33

w by

c

1.33

1

1.33

1.16

x by

w by

5.33

1

5.33

4.64 *

45.99

40

1.15

Completeness (C)

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001

c

F

23.48 ****
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interaction is illustrated in Figure 2.

The results of tests for simple

interaction effects and simple simple main effects (Kirk, 1968, pp. 222224) in this interaction are summarized in Table 12.

The results of

these tests indicate that the context by wording by completeness interaction is primarily due to differences in the completeness variable
when no context and positive wording are presented.

Subjects who were

provided incomplete information without a context and with positive
wording required more interrogative probes in order to solve the problem
than did those subjects who were given no context and positive wording,
but who were provided information which was complete.
Inspection of subjects' inter-probe latencies has suggested that
much of this context by wording by completeness interaction in the
Efficiency Score data was a function of random factors operating in
subjects' initial probe selections.

The probe-selection protocols for

most subjects indicated large latencies between probe selections.

This

was true even for the majority of those subjects who solved the problem
with the minimum of four probe selections.

These large inter-probe

latencies suggest that few subjects covertly executed a solution strategy to completion prior to the initial probe selection.

As a result,

if a subject was presented a set of interrogative probes in which only
one of the two solution strategies was possible, his subsequent performance was largely dependent upon his initial probe selection.

If the

strategy for which complete information was available was initially
attempted by a subject, then he needed fewer interrogative probes in
order to solve the problem.

However, if a subject's initial attempt

to solve the problem used the strategy for which the information

,
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Figure 2. Context by wording by completeness interaction for
the Efficiency Score data: Experiment I.
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TABLE 12
SIMPLE SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS AND SIMPLE INTERACTION EFFECTS
IN THE CONTEXT BY WORDING BY COMPLETENESS INTERACTION
FOR THE EFFICIENCY SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

5.33

1

5.33

4.64

*

8.34

1

8.34

7.25

*

x at wcl2

o.oo

1

0.00

x at wc 21

o.oo

1

0.00

x at wc

3.00

1

3.00

2.61

5.33

1

5.33

4.64

w at xc 11

4.09

1

4.09

3.56

w at xc

0.75

1

0.75

0.75

1

0.75

6.75

1

6.75

5.87

27.00

1

27.00

23.48

c at xw11

3.00

1

3.00

2.61

c at xw
12
c at xw
21

8.34

1

8.34

7.25

21.34

1

21.34

18.56

1.34

1

1.34

1.17

Context (X)
x at wc

11

22

Wording (W)

w at xc

12
21

w at xc

22
Completeness (C)

c at xw22

F

*

*
****
*
****
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TABLE 12 (CONTINUED)
SIMPLE SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS AND SIMPLE INTERACTION EFFECTS
IN THE CONTEXT BY WORDING BY COMPLETENESS INTERACTION
FOR THE EFFICIENCY SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT I

Source of Variance

F

4.16

1

4.16

3.62

XW at

c2

1.50

1

1.50

1.30

xc

at

wl

4.18

1

4.18

3.63

xc

at

w2
x1

1.50

1

1.50

1.30

0.50

1

0.50

x2

5.66

1

5.66

45.99

40

1.15

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001

x1 = Context
x2 = No

Context

= Positive

Wording

w2 = Negative

Wording

=

MS

cl

WC at

c1

df

XW at

WC at

W1

SS

Incomplete Information

c2 = Complete

Information

4.20

*
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provided was incomplete, he was subsequently forced to select more than
the minimum number of probes needed for problem solution, thus raising
the value of his Efficiency Score.

Further support for this suggestion

that the initial probe choices are the result of random selections rather than the careful consideration of the available information derives
from the fact that of the 24 subjects in Experiment I who were provided
complete information, 11 subjects initially selected probes which could
be used in one of the strategies, while the remaining 13 subjects initially selected probes which could be used in the other solution strategy.

By chance, one would expect 12 subjects to initially select probes

from each of the possible solution strategies.

Pearson's X2 test for

goodness of fit supported the suggestion of randomness in these findings
[X 2 (1)

= 0.083, p>.80).

Furthermore, if the initial probe selections

are random, then for those subjects who were provided incomplete information, one would expect the number of subjects initially selecting
probes which could be used in the permissible strategy to equal the
number of subjects initially selecting probes from the non-permissible
strategy.

Consistent with this conjecture, Pearson's

x2

test of asso-

ciation indicated randomness in the initial probe selections [X 2 (1)
. 0.166, p>.60).

=

These findings, along with the fact that the majority

of the subjects (40 out of 48) continued in the solution strategy from
which the initial probes were selected, further confirm the assertion
that the Efficiency Scores of those subjects who were provided incomplete information were largely determined by random factors operating
in the initial probe selections.

As a result, further analyses of the

data from Experiment I have been disregarded.

r
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Pearson

x2

tests of association were planned to evaluate the

effect of the context, wording, and completeness variables upon the
solution accuracy data.

However, the solution rates approached unity

(i.e., only eight subjects failed to solve the problem), which resulted
in expected frequencies too small for legitimate tests.
Experiment II
A 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was done on the total time data, the results of
which are summarized in Table 13.
is not significant.

The predicted main effect of context

However, the main effects of paragraph complexity

and reading time, and the interaction of these two variables, are significant.

The complexity by reading time interaction is illustrated in

Figure 3.

Tests for simple main effects, the results of which are

summarized in Table 14, indicate that this interaction is primarily
due to the total time to solution required by those subjects in the
complex paragraph-one reading condition.

These subjects required sig-

nificantly more total time in order to solve the problem than did the
subjects in the other three conditions.

Performance in these latter

three conditions did not differ in themean total time to solution.
The results of a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA which was computed on the Efficiency Score data are summarized in Table 15.

While the predicted main

effect of context is not significant, the main effect of reading time
and the interaction of paragraph complexity by reading time are significant.

The complexity by reading time interaction is represented in

Figure 4.

The results of tests for simple main effects (Table 16) in-

dicate that this inte.raction is mainly due to the number of probe
selections required for solution by those subjects in the complex para-
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TABLE 13
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR TOTAL
TIME DATA: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

47926.44

1

47926.44

145984.60

1

145984.60

1114.43

2

557.21

120911.50

1

120911.50

x

2251. 67

2

1125.83

R by X

30256.76

2

15128.38

6687.89

2

3343.94

691903.90

84

8236.95

Complexity (C)
Reading Time (R)
Context (X)
C by R

c

by

C by R by X
Error
*p<.05
****p<.001

F
5.82 *
17. 72 ****

14.68 ****

1.84
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Complex
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Paragraph complexity by reading time interaction for

the total time data: Experiment II.
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TABLE 14
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS IN THE COMPLEXITY BY
READING TIME INTERACTION FOR THE TOTAL
TIME DATA: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance
Complexity (C)
C at R
1

C at R
2
Reading Time (R)

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001
Cl

= Simple

c2

=

Paragraph

Complex Paragraph

R1 = One Reading
R
2

= Three

Readings

SS

df

MS

47926.44

1

47926.44

160554.59

1

160554.59

8300.28

1

8300.28

145984.60

1

145984.60

589.68

1

589.68

266340.48

1

266340.48

691903.90

84

8236.95

F

5.82 *
19.49 ****
1.01
17.72 ****

32.34 ****

r
57

TABLE 15
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR EFFICIENCY
SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

F

Complexity (C)

1.26

1

1.26

1.18

Reading Time (R)

4.59

1

4.59

4.31 *

Context (X)

2.27

1

1.14

1.06

17.51

1

17.51

x

1.89

2

0.95

R by X

6.06

2

3.03

2.84

C by R by X

4.02

2

2.01

1.88

89.62

84

1.07

C by R

c

by

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001

16.41 ****

r
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TABLE 16
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS IN THE COMPLEXITY BY
READING TIME INTERACTION FOR THE
EFFICIENCY SCORE DATA: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

1.26

1

1.26

C at R1

14.25

1

14.25

C at R2

4. 76

1

4.76

4.46 *

Reading Time (R)

4.59

1

4.59

4.31 *

c1

2.12

1

2.12

1.99

R at c 2

20.28

1

20.28

89.62

84

1.07

Complexity (C)

R at

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001

c1 = Simple
c2

=

R
1

= One

R2

= Three

Paragraph

Complex Paragraph
Reading
Readings

F

1.18
13.32 ****

19.01 ****
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graph-one reading condition.

These subjects required significantly more

probe selections than did the remaining subjects.
A Pearson product-moment correlation between the Efficiency Scores
and the total time to solution yielded a correlation coefficient of 0.73
[.!_(94) = 10.36, p<.001].

This highly significant correlation indicates

that as the number of probe selections required for solution increases,
the time needed to solve the problem also increases, thus suggesting
that the Efficiency Score and total time measures of problem-solving
efficiency are covarying.

In an effort to eliminate this covariation

from the analyses, a 2 x 2 x 3 analysis of covariance (ANACOVA) was
computed treating total time as the variate and the Efficiency Scores
as the covariate.

In this way, the effect of the experimental manipu-

lations upon total time was measured independent of the concomitant
variation of the Efficiency Score measure.
ANACOVA are summarized in Table 17.

The results of this

Significance was obtained for

the main effects of paragraph complexity and reading time.

Those sub-

jects who were presented the simple paragraph describing the problem
situation required a mean adjusted total time to solution of 2.64 min.,
while the subjects who were presented the complex paragraph required
a mean adjusted total time of 3.17 min.

The mean adjusted total time

taken by subjects in the one reading and three reading conditions were
3.34 min. and 2.47 min., respectively.

The highly significant para-

graph complexity by reading time interaction obtained in the ANOVA on
the total time data, however, was not found in the present ANACOVA.
The mean adjusted total time required by those subjects in each of the
conditions generated by the factorial crossing of paragraph complexity
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TABLE 17
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE TREATING TOTAL TIME AS VARIATE
AND EFFICIENCY SCORE AS COVARIATE: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

Complexity (C)

23208.69

1

23208.69

Reading Time (R)

62835.00

1

62835.00

Context (X)

4567.50

2

2283.75

C by R

8969 .50

1

8969.50

c

x

1166.13

2

583.06

R by X

6216.38

2

3108.19

C by R by X

1372.44

2

686.22

Covariate

305172.56

1

305172.56

Error

386730.94

83

4659.41

by

*p<.05
****p<.001

F
4.98 *
13.49 ****

1.93

65.50
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and reading time is illustrated in Figure 5.

A comparison of the con-

tents of this figure with the illustration presented in Figure 3
demonstrates the survival of themain effects of paragraph complexity
and reading time, and the deterioration of the interaction of these
two variables.

A similar ANACOVA was computed treating the Efficiency

Scores as the variate and total time as the covariate.

No significant

effects were obtained from this analysis.
Supplementary analyses were done on the proportions of the total
time spent in preparation, i.e., the proportion of the total time which
elapsed between the presentation of the display board and the first
probe selection.

A Pearson product-moment correlation between these

proportions and total time yielded a highly significant correlation
coefficient [.!:_ = -0.54, !_(94) = 6.22, p<.001), as did a correlation
between these proportions and the Efficiency Scores [.!:_
-7.66, p<.001).

= -0.62,

!_(94)

These analyses indicate that as the proportion of the

total time spent in preparation increased, the total time and Efficiency
Score values decreased (i.e., as the proportion of the total time spent
in preparation increased, problem-solving performance improved).

The

proportions of the total time spent in preparation were further analyzed
by correlating these values with the total time residuals resulting from
the regression of total time on the Efficiency Scores.

In this way, the

correlation between the proportion of the total time spent in preparation and total time, statistically independent of the effects of the
Efficiency Score measure, was evaluated.
was found to be significant [.!:_

This correlation coefficient

= -0.12, !_(94) = -1.18, p>.25).

An ANACOVA was computed treating the proportions of the total time
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Figure 5.

Mean adjusted total time for subjects in the conditions

generated by the factorial crossing of paragraph complexity and reading
time: Experiment II.

r
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spent in preparation as the variate and treating total time and the
Efficiency Scores as covariates.
summarized in Table 18.

khe results of this ANACOVA are

The main effect of reading time and the inter-

action effect of reading time by context are significant.
time by context interaction is represented in Figure 6.

The reading
The results

of tests for simple main effects in this interaction are summarized in
Table 19.

Performance was equivalent in all conditions except when

subjects were presented the contextual cue f ollwoing three readings of
the problem situation.

These subjects spent a greater proportion of

the total time in preparation than did the remaining subjects.
Pearson X2 tests of association were planned in order to evaluate
the effects of the experimental manipulations upon the solution accuracy data.

Each of the 96 subjects correctly solved the problem,

however, which prevented the legitimate use of this statistical technique.
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TABLE 18
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE TREATiNG PROPORTION OF TOTAL
TIME IN PREPARATION AS VARIATE WITH TOTAL TIME AND
EFFICIENCY SCORE AS COVARIATES: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance

SS

df

MS

Complexity (C)

0.002

1

0.002

Reading Time (R)

0.176

1

0.176

Context (X)

0.062

2

0.031

C by R

0.000

1

0.000

c by x

0.001

2

0.0005

R by X

0.220

2

0.110

C by R by X

0.060

2

0.030

Covariates

1.313

2

0.656

20.21

Covariate 1

0.033

1

0.033

1.01

Covariate 2

0.527

1

0.527

16.22

Error

2.663

82

0.033

*p<.05
Covariate 1

= Total Time

Covariate 2

= Efficiency Scores

F

5.43 *

3.38 *

r
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TABLE 19
SIMPLE MAIN EFFECTS IN THE READING TIME BY CONTEXT INTERACTION
IN THE ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE WITH PROPORTION OF TOTAL
TIME IN PREPARATION AS VARIATE AND TOTAL TIME AND
EFFICIENCY SCORE AS COVARIATES: EXPERIMENT II

Source of Variance
Reading Time (R)

SS

df

MS

0.176

1

0.176

F
5.43 *

R at

x1

0.02

1

0.02

R at

x2

0.41

1

0.41

R at x 3

0.00

1

0.00

0.062

2

0.031

X at R1

0.07

2

0.035

1.06

x at R2

0.21

2

0.105

3.18 *

82

0.033

Context (X)

Error
*p<.05
****p<.001
x 1 = Context Before
x2 = Context After
x3 = No Context
Rl = One Reading
R2 = Three Readings

2.663

12.62 ****

r
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main effect of completeness of the information in the interrogative probe set was found to be significant for both the total time
and the Efficiency Score measures in Experiment I.

As was pointed out

above, subjects' initial probe choices appear to have been based not
upon the careful consideration of the available information, but rather,
upon the chance selection of probes prior to any verification that the
selected probes could actually be used in the solution of the problem.
Similar behavior has been observed by Mayer and Greeno (1975), who
found that when presented an unsolvable problem, most subjects proceeded to carry out calculations prior to inspecting the problem
materials to determine if a solution could be obtained.

As a result

of the suspected random nature of the initial probe selections in the
present experiment, one can project that differences between the incomplete and the complete conditions may have been inflated, especially for the Efficiency Score measure.

Those subjects who were given

complete information had a greater chance (from a purely stochastic
standpoint) of initially selecting probes which could be used in the
solution of the problem than did those subjects who were presented an
incomplete set of interrogative probes.

Furthermore, among those sub-

jects who were provided incomplete information, if an individual ts
initial probe selections were from the permissible strategy, his subsequent performance was arbitrarily better than was the performance of
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those subjects whose initial attempt to solve the problem employed the
strategy for which the information provided was insufficient for
solution.

Therefore, in view of this presumed randomness in the in-

itial probe selections, interpretations of the results from Experiment
I will be made with considerable caution.
As was expected, the main effect of wording in Experiment I is

significant for both total time and Efficiency Scores.

Due to the

transformations and reinterpretations necessary for the comprehension
of negative statements, those subjects who were presented interrogative probes which were negatively worded required a greater number of
probe selections and more total time in order to solve the problem
than did those subjects who were given positive probes.
Contextual availability was also found to be significant for both
the total time and the Efficiency Score measures in Experiment I.
Those subjects who were provided an appropriate context for the problem in the statement of the problem situation required less total time
and fewer probe selections than did those subjects who were not provided a context for the problem.

Bransford and Johnson (1972, 1973)

have argued that similar effects are due to the fact that a context
aids in the interpretation and organization of prose materials such
that they may be stored in a manner which is consistent with an individual's existing cognitive knowledge of the world.

Mayer and Greeno

(1975) similarly contend that meaningful materials facilitate the
development of connections between the input materials and information
already in an individual's semantic memory (i.e., external connectedness).

If such an explanation of contextual facilitation is accurate,

r
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then the context by wording interaction in Experiment I should have
been significant (hypothesis b).

This predicted interaction was de-

rived from Egan and Greeno (1973) and Mayer and Greeno (1975), in
which it was argued that once prose material has been organized and
integrated into an individual's existing knowledge structure, the use
of that material will be more flexible (thus rendering it more
susceptible to transformations and modifications) than if such an
organization and integration has not taken place.

The context by

wording interaction for neither total time nor Efficiency Scores was
found to be significant in Experiment I.

Furthermore, the main effect

of context in.Experiment II was found to have no effect upon either of
these measures of problem-solving efficiency.
While these null results suggest that the explanations of contextual facilitation offered above may be erroneous, there are several
plausible explanations for this lack of clear-cut evidence for contextual facilitation in the present study.

The most obvious of these

is that qualitative differences in the way in which information is
processed and stored when there is a context as opposed to when there
is not a context do not exist.

In view of the large number of studies

which have demonstrated the facilitating effects of contexts upon
memory (e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972, 1973; Doll & Lapinsky, 1974;
Dooling & Lachman, 1971; Dooling & Mullet, 1973) and problem solving
(Mayer & Greeno, 1975), however, such an explanation does not seem
warranted.

An alternate explanation derives from the contention that

memory processes are not crucial to problem-solving efficiency.

Again,

however, numerous studies (e.g., Duncan, 1959; Greeno, 1973; Posner,
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1973), as well as one's personal experiences, suggest that such an explanation should not be weighted too heavily.

Related to this latter

explanation, however, is the contention that there may be many levels
at which information may be processed.

As several researchers have

argued (e.g., Dooling, 1972; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Mistler-Lachman,
1972; Schwartz, Sparkman, & Deese~ 1970), while at a deep level of information processing we may remember prose material with respect to a
context, there may be a more shallow level of processing in which
sentences are understood and remembered, but without the benefit of
relating that information to a context.

In this respect, it seems

reasonable to suspect that the subjects in the present study may well
have dealt with the information in the statement of the problem
situation at this more shallow level of processing.

After solving two

practice problems which established the nature of the problemsolving task, the majority of the subjects were likely aware of the
type of information in the problem situation which was necessary for
problem solution, and that information could easily be retained without the aid of a context.

As Bransford and his associates (e.g.,

Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Bransford & Franks, 1971; Bransford

& Johnson, 1972, 1973; Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973) have
repeatedly pointed out, a subject\s performance depends not only on
what he reads, but also on the implications of that information in view
of the relevant knowledge he already has.

In the present study, the

relevant knowledge possessed by many subjects no doubt included the
fact that the problem solution could be achieved simply by remembering
the specific information about the object groupings, thus eliminating
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any need for a deeper, context-dependent processing of the information
in the problem situation.

While no conclusion concerning this con-

jecture may be inferred from the present study, subsequent investigations of this phenomenon might include a test of recall for the problem
situation following the problem-solving task.

Through the results of

such a recall test, an estimate of problem-solving efficiency relative
to the degree of memory for the problem materials might be obtained.
Subsequent investigations using the present methodology might also
limit the number of practice problems to one, thereby reducing the
extent to which subjects would be primed concerning the requirements
of the task.
The predicted (hypothesis c) paragraph complexity by reading time
interaction in Experiment II was obtained for both the total time and
the Efficiency Score data.

However, in neither the ANACOVA whichtreated

total time as the variate and Efficiency Score as the covariate nor in
the ANACOVA in which total time was the covariate and Efficiency Score
was the variate did this complexity by reading time interaction survive.

These results suggest that this interaction for both total time

and Efficiency Scores is due to the effects of the experimental
manipulations upon the number of probe selections required for solution.

When subjects were allowed only one reading of the statement

· of the problem situation, a greater number of probes were selected when
the statement was grannnatically and syntactically complex than when the
statement was expressed in simple and straightforward sentences.

When

three readings of the problem situation were allowed, however, no
differences in the number of probe selections as a function of com-
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plexity were observed.
Kintsch and Monk (1972) obtained similar results with a solution
11

accuracy measure of performance in an inferential
task.

problem-solving"

These researchers concluded from their study that the organ-

ization and storage of information in memory is independent of the
syntactic and grammatical complexity of the input materials, provided
sufficient time for processing of the materials is allowed.

Further-

more, these researchers suggested that since the simple and complex
versions of each experimental paragraph had in common only semantic
meaning, then subjects must have stored in memory representations of
this invariant semantic meaning in the paragraphs.

This interpretation

was not to imply that each subject's cognitive representation of the
problem materials was identical, but simply that what was stored in
memory by a subject was the semantic meaning which was shared by each
version of a paragraph.
While the results of the present study are consistent with those
obtained by Kintsch and Monk, the present findings seem to lend themselves better to an alternative interpretation.

The availability of a

semantic context did not influence problem-solving efficiency in
Experiment II.

Subjects (specifically those in the no context groups)

were apparently able to solve the problem by organizing and remembering only the relevant elements of the problem situation (i.e., the
object groupings) without relating this information to an existing
cognitive structure through the use of a semantic context.

This find-

ing suggests that subjects were not processing the input materials at
a deep, context-dependent level, a condition which Tulving (1972) has
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suggested is necessary for the storage of semantic content (p. 389).
If this is the case, then the significant paragraph complexity by reading time interaction in Experiment II is likely not attributable to
the storage of the invariant semantic contents of the simple and complex problem situations; rather, it appears to be dependent upon the
degree of organization of the relevant problem elements which was
achieved by the subjects.

Greeno (1972) and his associates (Egan &

Greeno, 1973; Mayer & Greeno, 1972) contend that such an organization
need not be based upon the semantic meaning of the problem situation;
it may simply consist of an understanding of the interrrelationships
of the problem elements themselves (i.e., internal connectedness).
These researchers have found that this latter superficial level of
connectedness is sufficient for the solution of problems which can be
solved by means of a straightforward use of the information in the
problem situation, but not for problems in which an interpretation of
the problem information is required.

As was mentioned earlier, by the

time the experimental problem was presented in the present study, most
subjects were likely aware of the requirements of the task, and therefore were able to solve the problem simply by organizing and remembering the object groupings themselves.

Such an organization and storage

of the specific problem elements resembles the internal connectedness
discussed by Greeno and his co-workers, which suggests that an interpretational use of the problem situation was not required for problem
solution in the present study; rather, an internal connectedness of the
object groupings was sufficient for solution.
In the simple version of the problem situation, the grouping of
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the objects was expressed in a logical and straightforward manner.
Therefore, those subjects who were presented this simple version were
able to achieve an internal connectedness of the relevant problem
elements with only a single reading of the problem situation.

However,

when the complex version was presented, more than a single reading was
required for an understanding of the interrelationships of the object
groupings.

In this latter case, three readings were apparently

sufficient for the development of this superficial structuring of the
problem elements, but when only one reading was allowed, subjects were
able to achieve internal connectedness only in the process of studying
and selecting interrogative probes.

As a result, these latter sub-

jects (i.e., in the complex paragraph-one reading condition) required
more probe selections and more time in order to solve the problem than
did the remaining subjects.
It is possible that not only the present results, but also those
of Kintsch and Monk, may have been due to the development of an internal connectedness of the problem elements by those subjects who were
provided sufficient reading time.

However, in view of the many

differences between the present study and that conducted by Kintsch
and Monk (e.g., piecemeal presentation of the problem situation vs.
allowing the subjects to see the entire paragraph at one time; allowing
subjects, at most, three readings of the problem situation vs. an unlimited amount of reading time; problem solution through the use of
information apart from that provided in the problem situation vs. an
inferential task in which the only information provided is in the
statement of the problem situation), a more moderate position has been
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taken here; namely, that each interpretation is accurate for the type
of experimental situation employed in the two studies.
The ANACOVA in which total time was treated as the variate and
Efficiency Score as the covariate indicated significant main effects
for paragraph complexity and reading time.

These findings indicate

that when the total time measure of problem-solving efficiency is considered apart from the time associated with the probe selections,
subjects required more time for problem solution when a complex problem
situation was presented than when a simple problem situation was provided; more time was also needed when a single reading was allowed than
when three readings were permitted.

These results suggest that due to

the complications in the problem organization resulting from the
syntactically complex statement of the problem situation or from limited
reading time, subjects in these conditions needed more time to understand the basic organization of the problem elements than did the remaining subjects.
Several studies have demonstrated the importance of preparation
in problem solving (e.g., Buri & Slaymaker, Note 1; Johnson, 1961;
Johnson, Lincoln, & Hall, 1961).

Supplementary analyses of the data

from Experiment II in the present study confirm these reports.

The

proportion of the total time spent in preparation was found to be
negatively correlated with total time and with the Efficiency Scores,
accounting for 29% and 38% of the variance, respectively.

As indicated

by the nonsignificant correlation between the proportion of the total
time spent in preparation and the total time residuals of the regression
of total time on the Efficiency Scores, each of these highly signifi-
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cant negative correlations is due to the inverse relationship of the
proportions of the total time spent in preparation to the number of
probe selections required for solution.

As the proportion of the total

time in preparation increased, the number of probe selections needed
for solution decreased.
Johnson et al. (1961) have offered a description of problemsolving behavior during preparation which may aid in the interpretation of these findings.

They found that subjects spent much of their

time during the preparatory period organizing a prospective solution
strategy.

Once that strategy was sufficiently organized by a subject,

he pr~ceeded to search for a behavior which would match his selected
strategy and result in problem solution.

In the present study, those

subjects who were provided sufficient time to process the input
materials were able to organize the information in the problem situation well enough that they could construct a solution strategy (or a
partial solution strategy) during the preparatory period.

The sub-

sequent attempts by these subjects to implement the selected strategies
in the solution of the problem generally met with success, as indicated
by the overall lower Efficiency Scores for these subjects.

When

insufficient processing time was allowed, however, subjects did not
have the problem elements organized well enough prior to the preparatory period that they were able to construct a prospective strategy
during that time.

As a result, many of these subjects made probe

selections prior to formulating a strategy, apparently in an effort to
obtain information which would enable them to organize the problem
materials and subsequently solve the problem.

The success of such an
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approach in which a problem solution is attempted prior to the formulation of a tentative strategy is evidenced by the relatively greater
number of probe selections required by these subjects for problem
solution.
A significant reading time by context interaction was obtained in
the ANACOVA in which the proportion of the total time spent in preparation was treated as the variate and total time and Efficiency Scores
were treated as covariates.

This finding indicates that when the

effects of total time and Efficiency Scores are eliminated from the
analyses, a greater proportion of the total time was spent in preparation when the context was provided after three readings of the
problem situation than in any other condition.

Apparently, while

reading the statement of the problem situation, subjects attempted to
organize the problem elements.

This basic organization was developed

and subsequently employed in the solution of the problem, provided
information presented later did not disrupt it.

When the context was

presented prior to the statement of the problem situation or when the
context was not provided, no new information was presented which would
require the subjects to reorganize the problem elements.

When the

context was presented after the reading of the problem situation,
however, subjects who had been able to construct a sufficient organization of the problem elements while reading the problem situation found
that what they had organized could be better understood within the
context of washing clothes.

These subjects (i.e., allowed three

readings) then took time prior to any probe selections to structure
the problem elements consistent with the given context.

Those sub-
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jects who were only allowed a single reading of the problem situation,
however, apparently were not able to construct an organization of the
problem elements during the reading time which was strong enough that
subsequent information would have a disruptive effect upon it.

This is

consistent with the conclusion offered above that subjects who were
provided only a single reading required more time subsequent to that
reading in order to gain an understanding of the basic organization of
the problem elements.

Only after this basic organization was under-

stood could subjects proceed to develop a deeper understanding of the
interrelationships of the problem elements and to devise a workable
solution strategy.

SUMMARY
Two experiments were .conducted to replicate and extend the
findings of previous research on the availability of contextual information in prose materials.

The problem was introduced with a consid-

eration of the nature of contextual availability and its effect upon
memory, and the role of memory in problem solving was then discussed.
Tentative support for the facilitative effects of contextual availability were obtained in Experiment I, but the contextual manipulations
in Experiment II were found to have no effect upon problem-solving
performance.

It is suggested that this lack of clear-cut evidence

for contextual facilitation is the result of a superficial level of
processing of the problem materials, which resulted from experimental
conditions which primed subjects as to the requirements of the task.
In Experiment II, total time to problem solution and the number of
items of information needed for solution were affected by paragraph
complexity when insufficient processing time was allowed.

No such

differences were obtained, however, when subjects were given sufficient
reading time.

The argument is advanced that contrary to the interpre-

tations of similar results offered in previous studies, these findings
are not the result of the storage of the semantic content of the input
materials.
The importance of preparation in the problem-solving process
was also observed.

As the proportion of the total time spent in pre-

paration increased, problem-solving performance improved.

These findings

indicate that the more time a subject spends formulating a solution
80

81
strategy prior to an attempt to actively solve the problem, the better

will be his performance.

REFERENCE NOTES
1.

Buri, J. R. & Slaymaker, F. L.

Preparation in problem solving:

The longer you look, the better you leap.

Paper presented at the

Forty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Psychological
Association, Chicago, 1975.
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Below are the instructions, as they were tape recorded and presented to each subject.

The instructions were also typed on a separ-

ate sheet of paper, thus allowing the subjects to read them as they
were being presented on the tape recorder.
"This is an experiment to see how well you can solve problems.
You will be asked to solve several problems, one at a time.
"For each problem you will be given several sentences to read.
These sentences describe a problem situation upon which the problem
is based.
card.

Each of these sentences is typed on a seperate index

You will be allowed to read and study each sentence for seven

seconds.

After you have read all of the sentences, the deck of index

cards on which the sentences are typed will be taken from you.
"At that time you will be given a problem display board like the
one that you see in front of you.

At the top of this display board

is typed the problem that I would like you to solve.

This problem is

based upon the sentences that were presented on the deck of index
cards.
"On the display board, just below the statement of the problem
is a series of narrow openings.
in it.

Each of these openings has a question

Among the questions in these openings are several of the

questions that a person might choose to ask in order to figure out the
solution to the problem.
"Your task is to solve the problem which is presented at the top
of the display board.

The problem can be solved by obtaining answers

the questions on the display board.

The answer to a question can be
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obtained by pulling the cardboard strip on which the question is
typed approximately

~

inch to the right until the answer appears in

the small square window next to the question.
"In solving the problem, you are free to choose which questions
you want answered, obtaining the answers to those questions which you
choose by pulling the cardboard strips on which those questions are
typed approximately
the windows.

~

inch to the right until the answers appear in

Remember:

You are free to choose any questions on the

display board that you want answered, but work as carefully and as
quickly as you can.
"To review the instructions briefly:
deck of index cards.

First, I will give you a

There is one sentence typed on each card, and

you will have seven seconds to read each sentence.

The way that you

will know when seven seconds is up is that I have beeps tape
recorded at seven second intervals.

When you hear the first beep,

proceed to the first sentence in the deck of index cards and read it
carefully.

Continue studying that sentence until you hear another

beep, at which time you should go to the next card in the deck and
read the sentence on that card.

Continue in this way until you have

read each sentence in the deck of index cards.
"At that time, I will give you a problem display board.

The

problem that I would like you to solve is stated at the top of the
display board, and it is based upon the information contained in the
deck of index cards.

The way that you are to solve the problem is

by getting answers to some of the questions on the display board.
You will find that you will need some of the answers, but not

necessarily all of them, in order to solve the problem.

In the end,

you will have to add, or subtract, certain numbers in order to
figure out what the exact solution is.
•

•

solution, tell me wh at it is.

II

Once you figure out the
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